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We study the effect of democracy on migration using different panel data estimators. Our analysis controls for
persistence in migration and country fixed effects. Employing the dynamic fixed effects estimation, we find a
significantly positive and robust effect of democracy on migration. Our baseline results show that migration
increases by 29% in the long-run due to democracy. When addressing the endogeneity of democracy with
instruments, our models provide comparable results.
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1 Introduction
The third democratization waves disseminated within regions across the world
brought more than half of countries from the authoritarian regime to demo-
cratic political regime during 1974-1990. These waves are taken into account
for the exogenous sources of variation in democratization (Acemoglu et al.,
2019; Kurzman, 1998; Huntington, 1993). As a result, the number of demo-
cratic countries increases after 1990. Migrants in receiving countries contribute
directly in economic growth and development while they indirectly contribute
to their countries of origin by providing remittances. Thus, migration encour-
aged by democracy increases welfare of both sending and receiving countries
(Mansoor et al., 2006). Even if the existing literature acknowledges the effects
of democracy on economic growth and development, democracy as a major
determinant for migration has not been analyzed on a big longitudinal dataset
(e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2019; Barro, 1996; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008;
Docquier et al., 2016).1
Democracy in recipient countries encourages immigrants providing several
incentives: First, a country with a better health care services can entice
migrants to move to that country. It is empirically documented that democratic
institutions spend significant part of their public resources in providing health
care services (e.g., Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Franco et al., 2004; Navia
and Zweifel, 2003; Kotera and Okada, 2017). These better health conditions in
host countries compared to home countries can be an incentive to immigrants.
1Throughout this paper, we use migration and immigration interchangeably.
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Second, social safety and security - social benefits (public benefits) - is a
another incentive which attracts the migrants to select a country to immigrate.
It includes affordable government housing, childcare benefits, unemployment
benefits, direct in-kind benefits of specific goods and services, and tax breaks.
Social benefits are targeted for the people of low income households, the
elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed or young. The third incentive through
which democracy of host countries motivates migrants to enter those countries
is the dual citizenship. Dual citizenship allows immigrants to do transnational
activities between home and host countries (Blatter, 2011; Faist, 2001). If
immigrant-receiving democratic countries allow dual citizenship, then it can
persuade people to immigrate to those countries (Piper and Rother, 2015). The
fourth incentive we contemplate for inducing immigrants is to allow them to
send remittances to their countries of origin. They send money to support their
families, relatives, friends and communities. These remittances are altruistic in
the sense that they do not receive any return from them. Immigrants choose a
nation which permits them to send remittances to their home countries. Fifth,
subsidized and quality education is another incentive that is provided by the
destination countries for immigration. Finally, development gaps between the
source and destination countries drive migrants to move: High development
countries motivates the emigrants of low development countries to immigrate
to those nations (Massey, 1990; Solimano, 2009).
Given these incentives, democracy is a pull factor for immigration and works
through mechanism: Immigration in a country can be attracted if the country
has an entitlement of human and civil rights for immigrants - a fundamental
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pillar for enticing new immigrants. Each immigrant can have equal rights to
have access to economic and social advantages, and do freedom of expression,
voice and participation in political activities as well as maintain their religious
practices. For example, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, political and
social disorders and conflict intensified in the Caucasus and South-East Europe
regions pushed huge number of refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons
to be immigrated to democratic countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
These immigrants can enjoy the full freedom of human rights and protection,
economic and social benefits from newly democratic countries which joined the
European union (Tonelli, 2003). On the other hand, although having a better
health care services in the South Africa, racial intolerance of South African
towards immigrants violates human rights which will discourage immigration
there (Crush, 2001). Thus, this mechanism along with the above incentives
shapes the direction of immigration of a democratic country.
In literature there has been a few studies concerning the relationship
between migration and democracy for a longitudinal data over a long time
period. Migration in literature means either emigration - people leaving their
home countries to settle permanently or temporarily in another countries - or
immigration - people living in countries permanently or temporarily where
they were not born including refugees. A number of papers, including Docquier
et al. (2016); Mercier (2016); Spilimbergo (2009), examine the link between
emigration and democracy. They argue that the emigration can affect the
democracy of home countries. While living in host democratic countries, they
can have political rights to do democratic practices and thus acquire democratic
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values. They can transform these values to their home countries by diaspora
interest groups or return migrants: Diasporas once in host democratic countries
may influence the quality of government of their home countries by hiring
lobbyists and may influence host countries’ policies toward home countries.
Return migrants can take part in politics and can change the democratic
attitudes in their home countries with the acquired democratic values from the
host countries. Also, foreign students as immigrants, they acquire democratic
values - when studying in host democratic countries - which they can apply
in their home countries as political leaders. These papers investigate the
effects of emigration on democracy and find positive and significant effects of
emigration on democracy to home countries. This implies that diasporas living
in host democratic countries help home countries to be democratic. These
are reverse studies of ours: We study the effects of democracy on immigration
where no diaspora interest groups for lobbying or return migrants for changing
democratic values in the country of origin are considered.
There are papers related to ours such as Ariu et al. (2016) and Bertocchi
and Strozzi (2008) which deal with the connection between institutions and
immigration: Both show the effects of institutions on migration; the former
examines the relationship between the quality of government and net flows
of migration (emigration-immigration of high skilled and low skilled labor) -
a part of immigration for the years 1990 and 2000 while the latter between
institutional role and migration rate. Using OLS method, Ariu et al. (2016)
find a positive and significant effects of institution on net flows of migration.
In contrast with this paper, we look at data for immigration stock in general
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over the period of 1960 to 2015 on a five-year interval and use dynamic panel
data regressions. Their variable of interest is quality of government while ours
is democracy. Democracy differs from the quality of government in sense that
the rights (freedom of expressions and freedom of organizations, voice and
accountability) of people are assigned in democracy through a legal framework
while these are in the definitions of latter.
Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) consider a dataset for 14 OECD countries -
a part of the world - for the time period over more than 100 years ago (1870-
1910). With economic and demographic variables, they include a political
institutional index consisting of democracy (Freedom House) and suffrage, and
find a significantly positive effects of political institutional index using IV model
in the static fixed effects estimator. However, this paper does not examine
a direct relationship between migration rate and institutional role as among
other variables, institutional role is one of determinants of migration rate in
their IV model. More importantly, this study does not cover dataset on time
period (1975-2015) at which migration and democracy increased across the
world (See Figures C.1 and C.2, Appendix C).
Rather than democracy and institutions, the existing literature also finds
other determinants of migration such as employment, rule of law and social
network. The employment level in destination countries affects the immigra-
tion and is positively correlated with it (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Massey,
1990; Mansoor et al., 2006). The fair and consistent outcomes of rule of law
between new immigrants and citizens in host countries are conducive for the
transition of immigration to citizenship - which is human rights for immigrants
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(Motomura, 2007). On the other hand, past migration or social network has a
positive impacts on current migration (Pedersen et al., 2008; Bauer et al., 2002;
Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2008). Thus, the lagged dependent variable indicating
past migrants captures the social network effect. The persistence in migration
may result from this social network from which our conceptual framework of
dynamic panel analysis follows.
Our interest in this paper is to establish a conditional correlation between
immigration and democracy using a large panel dataset for 189 countries from
1960 to 2015 at five-year interval. We pursue several strategies to establish
a relationship between immigration stock and democracy: First, following
Acemoglu et al. (2019), we construct a binary measure of democracy from
different prevailing democracy sources which indicates a precise transition of
political regimes unlike the existing democracy measures.2
Second, our analysis controls for persistence in migration (or dynamics of
migration) and country fixed effects. The lagged dependent variables in our
dynamic model capture the persistence in immigration stock which may be
due to the effect of social networks from past migration. The inclusion of
persistence in estimating the effect of democracy can provide different results
in this literature compared to a static fixed effects model. We use this in our
dynamic panel model to find the consistent estimate of parameter and the
model allows to find the long-run effects of democracy. Some papers consider
one lag of migration in a fixed effects model to capture the network effects
from past migrants. They do not control for the persistence in migration to
2See section 2 for details.
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find the consistent estimator. Thus, our results are different from theirs.
Finally, we use instrumental variable (IV) approach to address the endo-
geneity of democracy. We use lags as internal instruments for democracy in
GMM estimator while democratization waves are used as external instruments
for democracy in dynamic fixed effects (DFE) IV model.3 The existing analyzes
in political science, including Huntington (1993), Kurzman (1998) and Dooren-
spleet (2000), acknowledged that democratization waves are the exogenous
sources of variation in democracy which happen in a region because these waves
transform the autocratic countries to democratic ones and true for reversely.
Our instruments satisfy the exclusion restrictions implying that conditioning
on lagged outcome values, country and year fixed effects, instruments are
uncorrelated with error term. Our instruments, three lags of democratizations
waves and reversals, happened over 1960-1970 have no direct impacts on current
migration. However, they may be correlated with other factors in error term.
The correlation of the error terms becomes less and less as time period rises
and eventually disappears for a long time period. The exclusion restrictions
may be overturned due to omitted variables which are correlated together with
instruments and outcome variable. Controlling for economic, political and
alternative measures and instrument for democracy, our results remain similar
to preferred within estimates maintaining exclusion restrictions.
The contribution in this paper is twofold: First, this is the first paper
that builds a direct causal relationship between immigration and democracy.
Second, our panel data spanned from 1960 to 2015 on a 5-year interval consider
3In this paper, we use the dynamic fixed effects (DFE), dynamic within and within
estimators interchangeably to refer to the same estimator.
7
current time period - when democracy and immigration rises (1975-2015) -
which covers the entire world. Using dynamic within estimator, our results
indicate that there is a significantly positive relationship between democracy and
immigration stock. The preferred estimates in the baseline model demonstrate
that immigration increases by 29% due to democracy in the long-run. The
democratic effect further increases when using GMM and dynamic fixed effects
IV (DFEIV) estimators.
2 Data Sources and Description
In our analysis, our outcome variable is total international migration stock
(immigration stock) and main variable of interest is democracy: Both have data
for 189 countries from 1960 to 2015. Immigration stock and additional regressors
namely employment (percentage of population) and general government final
consumption expenditure (percentage of GDP) are used from World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017). Other regressors such as
rule of law, political stability or absence of violence, voice and accountability,
and control of corruption are used from the Worldwide Governance Indicators:
These indicators extend approximately from -2.5 to 2.5 where the lowest number
indicates weak while the highest number strong performance of government
(Kaufmann et al., 2011).
We construct a binary democracy variable, following Acemoglu et al. (2019),
by integrating data from Freedom House (FH), Polity IV, Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland (CGV), (Cheibub et al., 2010) and Boix, Miller, and Rosato (BMR),
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(Boix et al., 2012). FH classifies a country as free, partially free or not free by
considering political rights and civil rights in that society.4 Polity2 variable
in Polity IV data measures autocracy or democracy of a country assigning
values between -10 and +10 where -10 and +10 indicate full autocracy and
full democracy respectively.5 CGV and BMR each develops a dummy variable
for indicating democracy in a country.6 With our primary sources such as
the FH and Polity2, we construct the democracy variable assigning a 1 if the
political regime is classified as either free or partially free and if Polity2 has
strictly positive value, and otherwise 0. When one or both sources do not have
democratic score, we search for democratic value from our secondary sources,
CGV and BMR. In this way, we obtain a better measure of binary democracy
variable with a larger data set reflecting a more precise transition of political
regimes.7 8 This data set comprises of 30 permanent democratic countries, 90
countries which are transformed from non-democratic countries to democratic
4Political right comprises electoral process, political pluralism, participation and function-
ing of government. Civil right consists of freedom of expression and belief, association and
organization rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House,
2017).
5Polity2 variable relies on some criteria such as executive power, executive selections and
the freedom of elections.
6The democracy in CGV depends on dejure and defacto existence of parties and not
necessarily mean that they should have seats in the legislature. On the other hand, BMR
defines a country as democratic if the executive is elected by voters in popular elections and
a majority of adult men have the right to vote.
7Missing value means if any source has no democratic score for a particular year.
8Freedom House defines a political regime by assigning three scores: Free, partial free
and no free. Generally, empirical papers construct dichotomous variable by putting 1 for
democracy if it satisfies either free or partial free and otherwise 0. For example, Freedom
House assigns ”no free” in 1991 for Kuwait indicating non-democratic. However, in 1992
score from Freedom House is ”partial free” for Kuwait which presents that political regime
is democratic, but it remains authoritarian. On the other hand, from 1991 to 1992, polity 2
score rises from -9 to -7 in Kuwait which does not imply any transition of political regime.
So, existing indices do not provide the transition of political regime precisely. To avoid this,
we follow Acemoglu et al. (2019).
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ones, 35 permanent non-democratic and 34 countries from democratic to
non-democratic countries. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the
dependent and explanatory variables in our model.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean S.D
(1) (2) (3)
Immigration (Thousand) 2,120 756 2,517
Democracy (Binary variable) 2,280 0.456 0.498
Employment (Percentage) 875 57.700 11.443
Rule of law 1,980 -0.0201 0.516
Freedom House (Binary variable) 2,280 0.495 0.500
Polity2 (Continuous variable) 1,663 0.114 0.735
Papaioannou and Siourounis (Binary variable) 2,280 0.318 0.466
Democratization wave (Average value) 2,280 0.437 0.274
Government Consumption (Percentage) 1,631 15.774 6.607
Foreign democratic capital 1,671 0.303 0.121
Absence of violence 1,980 -0.017 0.505
Voice and Accountability 738 -0.059 1.128
Control of corruption 748 0.063 1.086
Note: The detailed description and source of each variable is found in the
text. Democracy is a dichotomous variable which takes 1 for democracy and
0 otherwise.
3 Model
3.1 Dynamic Within Model (Baseline)
We use a dynamic panel model to construct a relationship between immigration
stock and democracy. To estimate the effect of democracy on immigration
(immigration or migration hereafter), we use the DFE within model. Our
model is:




δlmi(t−l) + αi + γt + uit (1)
where, i = 1, 2, . . . , 189, are countries over the years t = 1960, 1965, . . . , 2015
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and lag l = 1, 2, . . . q, m, D, and u represent log of immigration, democracy
and the error term respectively. u contains all other factors excluded from the
model which directly may affect the outcome variable under ceteris paribus.
Our variable of interest is democracy: the coefficient β measures the effect
of democracy on immigration when a non-democratic country transforms
into democratic one and it is expected that β>0 implying a higher level of
immigration associated with democracy compared to non-democracy. The






the sum of autoregressive coefficients which measures the overall amounts of
persistence in migration. Some authors have argued that this is due to the
effects of networks from past immigration. Our model includes q lags on the
right hand-side to control for the persistence of migration. In our model, αi and
γt capture the country and year fixed effects respectively. The identification of
β in model (1) depends on zero conditional mean of error uit conditional on
the values of democracy, past immigration, country and year fixed effects:
Assumption 1: E(uit | Dit,mi(t−1), . . . ,mi(t−q), αi, γt) = 0, for all Dit,mi(t−1),
mi(t−2), . . . ,mi(t−q), αi, and γt.
This assumption implies that the error term is conditionally uncorrelated and
democracy, past immigration, country and year fixed effects are exogenous.
To estimate the long-run effects of democracy, we can derive the following
formula. If the lagged dependent variables are persistent, then in equilibrium
mit = mss, Dit = Dss. For simplicity, we account for one lag of immigration
(i.e., q=1) and ignore country and time fixed effects and error term in equation
(1). In a steady-state, mit = mit−1 = mss then
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which is a steady state immigration. This implies that when a country
transforms from non-democratic into democratic, then immigration rises
β
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δl converges to m ∈ (0, 1) where m is any number that
lies between 0 and 1. Since we find this effect after estimation, we use the












δ̂l converges to m ∈ (0, 1) implying that migration is
stationary.
Table 2 reports the estimated effects of democracy on immigration using
equation (1). Column 1 presents the impacts of democracy without accounting
for persistence in immigration. The estimated effect is positive and statistically
significant indicating around 21% rises in immigration due to the transition of
a non-democratic country into democratic. Figure C.5 of Appendix C shows a
positive relationship (partial) between migration and democracy.
Columns 2-4 of Table 2 show the dynamic within estimates by controlling
for the persistence in immigration. Column 2 controls for the first lag of
immigration in which the estimated coefficient of democracy indicates that there
is a significantly positive relationship between immigration and democracy. The
estimated democratic effect is 0.036 which implies immigration rises around 4%.
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while in the long-run it increases about 20%. The persistence in immigration
is positive and statistically significant: it is less than 1 which indicates that
migration is stationary.9
When adding one more lag of immigration in column 3, we notice that the
long-run effect of democratization is positive and significant, and is higher than
that of column 2. Though the estimate for second lag is negative, the overall
amounts of persistence in migration are significantly positive with less than
one.
With three lags of immigration, column 4 presents similar effects of democ-
racy with the previous columns. We take the maximum 3 lags in our analysis;
however, two lags of migration are our preferred lags which are selected using
the t-statistics on the estimated coefficients γ̂il.
10 Table 2 (columns 1-4) estab-
lishes a significantly positive relationship between immigration and democracy.
Our preferred specification indicates that the democratic effect on immigration
in the long-run is around 29% comared to non-democratic one. In all cases, we
also find that the overall degrees of persistence are significantly positive and
less than one: This implies migration is stationary.
We test the stationarity of migration with a panel unit root test. The result
of this test is reported in bottom row of Table 2. The p-value of Fisher-type
unit root test for an unbalanced panel rejects the presence of unit root in
9In Fisher-type unit root test, H0: All panels contain unit root; H1: At least one panel is
stationary.
10The maximum lags we considered in our analysis is 3. To select preferred lags, we
set the null hypothesis H0 : γil = 0 on the following augmented Dickey-Fuller regression,
∆mit = θimit−1 +
∑q
l γil∆mit−l + ǫit (See Baltigi 2005, ch.12; Wooldridge 2002, ch.18).
However, there is no hard rule to select the lags. One or two lags can be selected for yearly
data (See Wooldridge 2002, ch.18).
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migration.
Following assumption 1, democracy is exogenous and migration is stationary,
our estimate of beta is consistent. On the other hand, in dynamic within
transformation, the time-demeaning of the original equation 1 has removed
the unobserved heterogeneity across countries. The correlation of error terms
decreases as time period increases and eventually disappears for a long time
period. Thus, dynamic within estimator is consistent if T tends to infinity. The
time-invariant factors are captured by the dynamic within estimator. However,
time-varying factors can be correlated with democracy. In such case, our
dynamic within model may suffers from endogeneity and provides inconsistent
estimates.
While using lagged values of migration in within estimator, the problem of
Nickell bias appears which leads our baseline estimates biased and inconsistent.
This bias counts on with the order of 1/T which vanishes when T → ∞. As
we use a big longitudinal dataset, this bias is less in our case.11
3.2 GMM Estimator
Our dynamic within model suffers from endogeneity of democracy which occurs
due to the correlation of lagged migration with error term and democracy may
be contemporaneously endogenous. To address this issue, we employ the first-
differenced generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and
11For instance, investigation of Monte Carlo simulation suggests that bias decreases as
time periods are larger than 20 (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Bias is around from 1%
to 2% of the true parameter as suggested by Judson and Owen (1999) when T is 30 while it
is around 2% and 3% when T is 20. In our case, bias is less as T is very large.
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Bond (1991) which also removes time-invariant factors.12As mi,t−1 is correlated
with the first-differenced error term, it is no longer be an instrument for the first-
differenced lagged regressors. However, mi,t−2, mi,t−3, . . . , have no correlation
with the first-differenced error term. These are considered as instruments for
the first-differenced regressors of equation 1. On the other hand, democracy
may be contemporaneously endogenous. In this case, Dit−1 is not an instrument
for the first-differenced regressors as it is correlated with the first-differenced
error term. However, Dit−2, Dit−3,.., are taken into account as instruments for
the first-differenced regressors of equation 1 which are uncorrelated with the
first-differenced error terms. These instruments in GMM are called internal
instruments which follow the orthogonal moments’ condition in model 1:
E(∆uit(mis, Dis)
′
) = 0, ∀s ≤ t− 2
.
Columns 5-7 of Table 2 present results obtained from GMM estimation. All
specifications show that estimated effects and long-run effects of democracy
modestly larger than dynamic within estimates (columns 2-4). This may result
from using internal instruments for regressors in GMM estimator. On the other
hand, the degree of persistence in each specification slightly less than the overall
persistence from corresponding lag in dynamic within estimates. Column 6
present our preferred specification in Arellano-Bond estimator which shows
that democratic effect is 62% which is larger than preferred dynamic within
12We use the dynamic IV estimator or Arellano-Bond estimator or GMM estimator or
difference-GMM estimator interchangeably in this paper to refer to the same estimator.
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estimate (column 3). Also, column 6 demonstrates that p-value of AR2 test
cannot rejects the null of no autocorrelation in residual. Thus, our estimates are
consistent in this specification with lag 2. While estimates in GMM estimator
are modestly larger than dynamic within estimates, they remain similar.
Table 2: The effect of democracy on immigration
DFE estimates GMM estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Democracy 0.208∗∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.042) (0.040) (0.047)
Log immigration 0.818∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗
first lag (0.022) (0.050) (0.058) (0.028) (0.083) (0.081)
Log immigration -0.177∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
second lag (0.041) (0.076) (0.057) (0.083)
Log immigration 0.023 0.036∗∗∗
third lag (0.047) (0.040)
Long run effect 0.200∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗
of democracy (0.119) (0.103) (0.094) (0.205) (0.230) (0.254)
Persistence 0.818∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗
in immigration (0.022) (0.030) (0.042) (0.028) (0.037) (0.044)
Unit root test (p-value) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR1 test (p-value) 0.002 0.000 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.386 0.599 0.093
No. instruments 120 117 112
Hansen (p-value) 0.278 0.363 0.282
No. country 189 189 188 188 188 188 188
No.observation 2,120 1,931 1,742 1,554 1,366 1,554 1,366
Note: Dependent variable is log of immigration stock and independent variable is democracy. Column 1,
columns 2-4 and columns 5-7 indicate the estimates from static fixed effects, dynamic fixed effects(DFE)
and Arellano-Bond GMM estimates respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
are reported in parentheses. All specifications capture country and year fixed effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
3.3 Robustness
Although model 1 captures time-invariant factors by controlling for country
fixed effects, time-varying error factors are not taken into account. These
omitted variables may be correlated simultaneously with regressors and outcome
variable: This may lead our baseline estimates biased and inconsistent. To
address this issue, we consider several strategies.
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We use control variables such as employment and rule of law in Table 3 to
check the robustness of baseline findings. In Table 3, column 1 of Panels A and
B is reproduced from column 3 and column 6 of Table 2 to make comparison.
Employment in host countries can directly affect immigration and may be
endogenous to democracy: one lag of this factor is used as an instrument of
it. Although long-run effect sightly decreases, we find no estimated effect of
it on immigration (column 2, Table 3). In column 3 of Table 3, we control
for rule of law which plays vital role for immigration of destination countries.
Instrumenting it with one lag of it, our results remain similar to preferred
estimates. Panel B presents Arellano-Bond estimates while controlling for
these factors in our model. The democratic effects largely increases compared
to preferred estimates due to controlling for employment in GMM estimator
(Panel B, Table 3, column 2). Controlling for rule of law provides similar results
to our preferred GMM estimates indicated in column 3 of Panel B.
17
Table 3: The effect of democracy on immigration with controls
Preferred Employ Rule of
Covariates estimates ment law
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: DFE estimates
Democracy 0.060∗∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.036) (0.024)
Log immigration 0.971∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
first lag (0.050) (0.054) (0.052)
Log immigration -0.177∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
second lag (0.041) (0.038) (0.042)
Long-run effect 0.291∗∗∗ 0.195∗ 0.360∗∗∗
of democracy (0.103) (0.115) (0.103)
Persistence in 0.795∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗
immigration (0.030) (0.051) (0.032)
No. Observations 1,742 696 1,642
No. country 188 174 178
Panel B: GMM estimates
Democracy 0.100∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.068) (0.044)
Log immigration 1.015∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗
first lag (0.083) (0.085) (0.076)
Log immigration -0.17733∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
second lag (0.057) (0.059) (0.055)
Long-run effect 0.616∗∗∗ 1.060∗ 0.799∗∗∗
of democracy (0.230) (0.635) (0.246)
Persistence in 0.838∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗
immigration (0.037) (0.052) (0.035)
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.420 0.482 0.626
Hansen (p-value) 0.261 0.280 0.279
No.instruments 57 57 117
No. country 188 174 178
No.observation 1,554 522 1,464
Note: Dependent variable is log of immigration while indepen-
dent variable is democracy. Control variables are such as log
of employment rate and rule of law. We consider one lag of
employment and rule of law in columns 2 and 3 respectively.
Robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial cor-
relation at the country level are reported in parentheses. All
models include country and year fixed effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
Additionally, we use alternative binary and continuous measures of democ-
racy to check robustness of baseline preferred estimates. We account for binary
measures of Freedom House (FH), Papaioannou and Siourounis (PS) and con-
tinuous measure of Polity2 in Table 4. While estimates from FH are modestly
higher in Panel A, our preferred estimates are very similar to estimates of
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polity2 and PS. Panel B also provides similar results to preferred estimates
and results are consistent.13 When using Arellano-Bond estimator there may
have finite sample biased due to instrument proliferations. This may not be
happened in our case as Panel B of Tables 2, 3 and 4 show that the number
of instruments cannot exceed the number of countries (the rule - of - thumb).
Nonetheless, to address this issue we employ alternative GMM estimator in
which we use truncated lags to 5. Results are reported in column 5 of Table A.1
(Appendix A). This specification provides similar estimates to our preferred
findings from GMM estimator.
Moreover, our results may be driven due to outliers in our dataset and we
account for these in our analysis which are reported in columns 2-3 of Table A.1
(Appendix A). To check it, we exclude observations which have more and less
than three standard deviation from mean. We also take into account Cook’s
distance which ignore the observations that have larger distance measured by
rule - of - thumb threshold (four divided by total observations). In both cases,
our results remain similar to baseline findings. Thus, incorporating economic
and political controls, replacing our democracy with it’s alternative measures
and considering outliers analysis, our results remain similar to baseline preferred
estimates.
13To check robustness our result, we use the democratic measure of Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2008). Their dichotomous democracy covers from 1960 to 2005 while we extend
it to 2015. PS in Table 4 stands for Papaioannou and Siourounis.
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Table 4: The effect of democracy on immigration with
alternative measures of democracy
Ours FH Polity2 PS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: DFE estimates
Democracy 0.060∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
Log immigration 0.971∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗
first lag (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Log immigration -0.177∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
second lag (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040)
Long-run effect 0.291∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
of democracy (0.103) (0.101) (0.093) (0.095)
Persistence in 0.795∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗
immigration (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030 )
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,415 1,742
No. of country 188 188 158 188
Panel B: GMM estimates
Democracy 0.100∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.031) (0.032) (0.038)
Log immigration 1.015∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗
first lag (0.083) (0.083) (0.071) (0.084)
Log immigration -0.177∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
second lag (0.057) (0.057) (0.053) (0.057)
Long-run effect 0.616∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.253∗ 0.634∗∗∗
of democracy (0.230) (0.188) (0.153) (0.227)
Persistence in 0.838∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
immigration (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037)
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.599 0.582 0.533 0.627
Hansen (p-value) 0.363 0.018 0.283 0.050
No. instruments 117 90 117 90
No. country 188 188 158 188
No. observation 1,554 1,554 1,254 1,554
Note: Dependent variable is log of immigration while independent
variables are alternative measures of democracy such as FH stands for
Freedom House, Polity2 (continuous) and PS stands for Papaioannou
and Siourounis. Robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation at the country level are reported in parentheses. All
specifications include country and year fixed effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
3.4 Dynamic Fixed effects IV Model
Model 1 captures the time-invariant unobservable factors by country fixed
effects when ignoring the time varying factors. As a result, our estimates
from dynamic within estimator may be biased and inconsistent due to time-
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varying error factors correlated simultaneously with democracy and migration.
To address this issue, we employ instrumental variable (IV) strategy. The
democratizations waves are taken into account as external instruments for
democracy although internal instruments for democracy are used in GMM
estimator earlier.
In 1828 in the USA, the first democratization wave began which transformed
45% of countries in the world from authoritarian rule to democratic institutions
over the period 1828-1922. On the other hand, there was a 20% of democratic
countries moved back into non-democratic ones by reverse waves between 1922
and 1942. After the second world war, although 32% of authoritarian regimes
converted into democratic political regimes by the second democratization waves
ended 1962, reversal waves brought back 25% of democratic countries into
autocratic rule from 1962 to 1973 (Kurzman, 1998). Commenced in Portugal in
1974, the third democratization wave spread to Africa, Asia and Latin America.
During 1986-1988 in the Asia Pacific region, this wave transformed Philippines,
South Korea and Taiwan into representative democratic countries. On the other
hand, in the 1980s, it affects Latin America and continue to bring countries
under democratization which ended in 1989 in the Eastern Europe after the
collapse of the communism. More than half of countries of the world changed
into institutions of representative governments by the third democratization
wave (Doorenspleet, 2000; Huntington, 1993). During 2010-2012, Arab Spring,
a fourth democratization wave, failed to transform any authoritarian regime
into democratic one except Tunisia in 2016. However, it brought about some
political and economic rights and freedom in the Middle East and North Africa
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(Abbasi, 2012). Thus, democratization and reversal waves occurred within a
region are considered as exogenous sources of variation in democracy.
We use the lags of average democratization and reversal waves as instruments
for democracy. To construct this variable, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2019)







where, zit conveys the average democratization and reversal waves in country
i at time t: This presents demand for or discontent of democratic regimes.
The World Bank classifies the whole world into seven geographical regions
namely East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America
and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Ii denotes one of these regions to which country i
belongs to. We use the lags of zit as instruments for democracy.
Our two-stage DFEIV estimator is:14













θlmi(t−l) + τi + ψt + εit (4)
The equations 3 and 4 are the second-stage and first-stage respectively. Lags
14We use DFEIV and IV models interchangeably in this paper.
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of zit, i.e., zi(t−l) are instruments in our model. In our two-stage DFEIV model,
β is identified if instruments satisfy two conditions: First, there is non-zero
correlation between democracy and instruments implying either λ1 6= 0 or
λ2 6= 0 or . . . or λr 6= 0 (or all) which can be tested with t test for a single
instrument and F test for more than one instruments. The second condition
for identification of β relies on zero conditional mean of error term:
Assumption 2: E(uit | zi(t−1), . . . , zi(t−r),mi(t−1), . . . ,mi(t−q), αi, γt) = 0, for all
zi(t−1), . . . , zi(t−r),mi(t−1), . . . ,mi(t−q), αi and γt.
We can justify the validity of our instruments with this condition: The in-
struments, z(t− 1), z(t− 2), . . . , z(t− r), excluding from equation (3) satisfy
exclusion restrictions when they are uncorrelated with error factors conditioning
on the country and year effects, and lagged outcome values; they have no direct
effects on migration stock today and they can have only effects on migration
via the effects on democracy. This can be tested with overidentification test.
A consistent estimate of β can be achieved in our DFEIV model if migration is
stationary alongside the satisfying overidentification restrictions.
The IV estimates of equations (2) and (3) are presented in Table 5. We
use three lags of democratization waves as instruments following Wooldridge
(2002).15 In the second-stage, Column 1 of the table shows that immigration
rises largely due to democracy when we use IV in static within model. The
estimated effect of democracy is higher than that of the corresponding baseline
estimates in column 1 of Table 2. This implies our OLS estimator suffers
15We choose the number of instruments following Wooldridge (2002, ch.15). To find the
validity of instruments, we continue to add instruments when the estimated values and the
efficiency of estimator rises. We stop adding instruments after taking into account three
instruments when we find that estimate and standard error on democracy decreases.
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from the omitted variables bias. Columns 2-4 present the DFEIV estimates
accounting for the persistence of migration.
Columns 2-4 of Table 5 rely on one, two and three lags of immigration
respectively. Both the estimated and long-run effects of democracy presented
in column 2 are significantly positive and higher than that of the corresponding
estimates in Table 2. The impacts of democracy reported in column 3, which is
our preferred specification, is significantly positive. The estimated and long-run
effects from IV estimates in column 3 of the table are 0.443 and 1.490 compared
to 0.060 and 0.291 in column 3 of Table 3: The preferred estimates in IV model
are higher than dynamic within estimates. Column 4 relies on three lags of
migration: The results are similar to column 3. In all specifications columns 2
through 4, the sum of coefficients of dependent lagged variables is less than
one which implies that migration is stationary.
In first-stage, one lag of democratization waves is significantly positive in all
columns 1-4 indicating that instrument is highly correlated with democracy and
even though second and third lags of zit are not significant, their joint effects are
highly significant which can be observed from the p-value of F-test. Columns 1
through 4, F-statistic in the first-stage is greater than 10 indicating the lags of
democratization and reversal waves as strong instruments for democracy. We
have three IVs for one endogenous variable which implies that we have two
overidentifying restrictions.
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Table 5: The IV estimates of effect of democracy on immigration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-stage
Democracy 1.294∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.093) (0.098) (0.103)
Log immigration 0.732∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗
first lag (0.034) (0.051) (0.058)
Log immigration -0.204∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
second lag (0.045) (0.074)
Log immigration 0.0003∗∗∗
third lag (0.048)
Long run effect 1.453∗∗∗ 1.490∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗
of democracy (0.309) (0.267) (0.268)
Persistence in 0.732∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗
immigration (0.034) (0.042) (0.047)
First-stage
First-lag of zit 0.743∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.099) (0.103) (0.106)
Second-lag of zit -0.040 -0.033 -0.023 -0.026
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.099)
Third-lag of zit 0.102 0.114 0.109 0.107
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
F-test (P-value) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Exc. instruments 42.42 32.98 32.65 32.16
Hansen p-value 0.095 0.742 0.604 0.489
Observations 1,625 1,600 1,577 1,554
No. of country 189 188 188 188
Note: In the first-stage, dependent variable is democracy whereas
log of immigration is a dependent variable in the second-stage. zit
denotes average democratizations and reversals waves. Robust stan-
dard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the coun-
try level are reported in parentheses. All specifications capture
country and year fixed effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
The p-values of Hansen J statistic are greater than 0.05 implying that our
instruments are valid, i.e., our IVs are exogenous which imply that they are
uncorrelated with error term; hence they have no direct effects on immigration
stock today: They can only affect immigration through democracy.1617
All results in columns 2-4 of Table 5 demonstrate that the overall magnitudes
of persistence in migration are significantly positive with less than one: This
means that migration is stationary. With instruments, the endogeneity of
democracy is addressed. Thus, our estimates of beta are consistent.
16See Wooldridge 2002, ch.15.
17In overidentification test, H0: All instrument are exogenous; H1: At least one instrument
is endogenous.
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Our relationship between immigration and democracy may be threatened by
time-varying factors: They may be correlated with IVs and outcome variable.
To examine this, we pursue two strategies: We add more covariates as controls
in the model and we look at exclusion restrictions.
We add economic variables such as employment and government consump-
tion as controls in our model. The results are reported in Table 6. Column 1 of
Table 6 repeats the IV estimates reported in column 3 of Table 5 for comparison.
In column 2, we include employment rate which may be correlated with our IVs
and immigration: This may invalidate exclusion restrictions. However, adding
this control provides larger estimates both for the estimated and long-run
effects compared to preferred estimates. In column 3, we find similar effects
to preferred estimates when controlling for rule of law in the IV model. In
column 4 our control is government consumption which affects immigrants
by spending on public health care services, education, and social safety nets
(Kotera and Okada, 2017). Our results remain similar to preferred estimates
though long-run cumulative effect slightly rises. When controlling economic
and political variables in Table 6, our estimates remain largely similar to our
preferred findings albeit our exclusion restrictions can not be overturned.
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Table 6: The IV estimates of effect of democracy on immigration
with controls
Preferred Employ Rule of Government
Covariates estimates ment law consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-stage
Democracy 0.443∗∗∗ 1.989∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.098) (1.025) (0.110) (0.106)
Log immigration 0.907∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗
first lag (0.051) (0.111) (0.059) (0.048)
Log immigration -0.204∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗
second lag (0.045) (0.116) (0.049) (0.049)
Long run effect 1.490∗∗∗ 4.739∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗
of democracy (0.267) (2.204) (0.246) (0.424)
Persistence 0.702∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗
in immigration (0.042) (0.098) (0.051) (0.033)
First-stage
First-lag of zit 0.709∗∗∗ 0.108 0.724∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.091) (0.114) (0.102)
Second-lag of zit -0.026 0.038 -0.048 0.029
(0.094) (0.104) (0.093) (0.100)
Third-lag of zit 0.109∗∗∗ 0.096 0.104∗∗ 0.081
(0.072) (0.067) (0.074) (0.071)
F-test (p-vale) 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000
Exc. instruments 32.65 2.22 26.72 18.40
Hansen p-value 0.604 0.984 0.804 0.647
No. Observations 1,577 847 1,309 1,299
No. country 188 174 178 174
Note: In the first-stage, dependent variable is democracy whereas log
of immigration is a dependent variable in the second-stage. All controls
are in log form except rule of law. Robust standard errors for het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are reported
in parentheses. All specifications capture country and year fixed effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
In addition, we use alternative measures of democracy in our model. The
estimates in column 1 of Table 7 are reproduced from the column 3 of Table 5
to compare the results. Substituting our democracy variable with a number of
dichotomous and continuous measures of democracy, we obtain similar results
to preferred estimates though FH binary variable shows modestly larger effects.
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Table 7: The IV estimates of effect of democracy on immigration with
alternative measures of democracy
Ours FH Polity2 PS
(continuous)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-stage
Democracy 0.443∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.173) (0.074) (0.139)
Log immigration 0.907∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
first lag (0.051) (0.053) (0.048) (0.054)
Log immigration -0.204∗∗∗) -0.193∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
second lag (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Long run effect 1.490∗∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗
of democracy (0.267) (0.558) (0.204) (0.430)
Persistence in 0.702∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
immigration (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042)
First-stage
First-lag of zit 0.709∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.096) (0.132) (0.113)
Second-lag of zit -0.026 -0.092 -0.036 -0.041
(0.094) (0.083) (0.103) (0.098)
Third-lag of zit 0.109 0.011 0.134 0.052
(0.072) (0.062) (0.084) (0.074)
Exc. instruments 32.65 15.99 28.24 16.81
Hansen p-value 0.604 0.145 0.435 0.456
No.observations 1,577 1,577 1,294 1,577
No.country 188 188 158 188
Note: In the first-stage, dependent variable is democracy whereas log of
immigration is a dependent variable in the second-stage. Robust standard
errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are
reported in parentheses. All specifications capture country and year fixed
effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
Also, we use alternative instrument of democracy such as foreign democratic
capital to check robustness of results (Table 8). The influences of democracy,
also called democratic waves, affect the people of neighboring countries. We
construct this variable following Persson and Tabellini (2009). The result is
very similar to our preferred IV estimates (Column 3, Table 5) even if FH
produces modestly larger long-run effects.18
18See Appendix B.
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Table 8: The IV estimates of effect of democracy with alternative
instrument of democracy
Ours FH Polity2 PS
(continuous)
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Second-stage
Democracy 0.525∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.180) (0.064) (0.107)
Log immigration 0.922∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
first lag (0.055) (0.053) (0.049) (0.055)
Log immigration -0.202∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗
second lag (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.048)
Long-run effects 1.873∗∗∗ 2.622∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
of democracy (0.358) (0.542) (0.205) (0.301)
Persistence 0.720∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
in immigration (0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
First-stage
Foreign democratic 1.302∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗
capital (0.160) (0.137) (0.064) (0.165)
Exc. instruments 67.04 44.54 94.90 75.11
No. observation 1,423 1,423 1,415 1,423
No. country 159 159 158 159
Note: In the first-stage, dependent variable is democracy whereas log of
immigration is a dependent variable in the second-stage. Robust standard
errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are
reported in parentheses. All specifications capture country and year fixed
effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
Furthermore, we include controls of quality of government such as absence of
violence or political stability, voice and accountability, and control of corruption
in our model. These factors may cause adverse effect on democracy. Column 3
of Table 5 is reproduced in column 1 of Table 9 to compare the estimates. While
maintaining exclusion restrictions, we achieve very similar findings to preferred
IV estimates although controls for voice and accountability and control of
corruptions produce modestly larger effects.
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Table 9: The IV estimates of effect of democracy on immigration with
the controls of quality of government
Preferred Absence Voice Control
Covariates estimates of and of
violence accountability corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Second-stage IV estimates
Democracy 0.443∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗
(0.098) (0.110) (0.539) (0.525)
Log immigration 0.907∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗
first lag (0.051) (0.057) (0.120) (0.118)
Log immigration -0.204∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗
second lag (0.045) (0.048) (0.114) (0.114)
Long run effect 1.490∗∗∗ 1.3042∗∗∗ 4.074∗∗ 3.935∗∗
of democracy (0.267) (0.253) (1.862) (1.710)
Persistence 0.702∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
in immigration (0.042) (0.051) (0.069) (0.068)
Exc.instruments 32.65 26.55 2.86 3.13
Hansen p-value 0.968 0.891 0.169 0.540
No.observations 1,577 1,309 728 740
No.country 188 178 186 187
Note: In the first-stage, dependent variable is democracy whereas log of
immigration is a dependent variable in the second-stage. Robust standard
errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level are
reported in parentheses. All specifications capture country and year fixed
effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
Overall, we use dynamic within, Arellano-Bond and DFEIV estimators
where Arellano-Bond estimation uses internal instruments while external in-
struments are used in our two-stage DFEIV model. Even though DFEIV model




We use different panel data estimators to investigate the relationship between
migration and democracy. Our analysis relies on an unbalanced panel data
of 189 countries at a 5-year interval over the period 1960-2015. This paper
applies the dynamic within estimator with controlling for country fixed effects
and persistence in migration. We also use Araellano-Bond estimator to find
consistent estimates accounting for large (or finite) sample size. Our baseline
findings indicate a significantly positive relationship between migration and
democracy. The preferred specification implies that immigration rises by 29% in
the long-run due to democracy. The democratic effect on immigration increases
when lags as internal instruments are used in the GMM estimation. Employing
regional waves of democratizations and reversals as external instruments for
democracy in the dynamic fixed effects IV, the long-run effect further rises.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A.1: The effect of democracy on migration accounting for outliers and
alternative GMM estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.060∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.040) (0.053)
Long-run effect of democracy 0.291∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.556∗
(0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.230) (0.340)
Persistence in migration 0.795∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036)
AR1 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000
AR2 test (p-value) 0.599 0.558
No. instruments 117 96
Hansen P-value 0.363 0.123
No. country 188 188 185 188 165
Observations 1,742 1,738 1,675 1,554 990
Note: Dependent variable is migration while democracy is independent variable. Col-
umn 1 presents our preferred specification. Columns 2-3 indicate estimates using our
preferred specification when excluding observations more than three standard deviation
from mean and omitting observations above Cook’s distance respectively. Column 4 is
our preferred specification in GMM estimator which includes 2 lags while column 5 uses 5
lags. The estimated effect of democracy is significant at a 11% level of significant. Robust
standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Dependent
variable is GDP per capita while independent variable is total life expectancy. All models
include country fixed effects.
∗p <0.10, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗∗∗p <0.01.
Appendix B: Foreign Democratic Capital
B1: Democratic capital
We cannot observe foreign democratic capital directly, as this variable occurs
in the neighboring countries when they are in democracy. The influences
of democracy, also called democratic waves, affect the people of neighboring
countries. Hence, we make a proxy for this factor. This variable is denoted by
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where, P stand for a binary democracy variable which is 1 if the polity2 value
is positive and 0 otherwise. ω(ρ) presents the weight parameter. Let D be the
great circle (the shortest distance between any two points on a sphere) between
capitals i and j, which is time-invariant and N denotes the number of countries











and ω(ρ)i,tt = 0 if
Di,t
D
> ρ ·ω(ρ)i,tt is a declining function of distance between
i and j. If the relative distance is outside the radius ρ, then the weight drops
to zero. Dividing ft by 10, we get foreign democratic which is scaled to [0, 1].
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Appendix C: Figures
Figure C.1: Bar diagram between years and immigration.
Note: This figure shows mean of migration over year. The horizontal axis
measures years and vertical axis shows mean of migration. Here, ims stand for
international immigration stock.
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Figure C.2: Bar diagram between years and democracy.
Note: This figure shows Bar diagram of democracy over year. The horizontal
axis measures years and vertical axis measures mean of democracy. Here, demo
denotes democracy.
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Figure C.3: Relationship between years and log of immigration.
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Figure C.4: Relationship between years and democracy
Note: This figure demonstrates mean of democracy on the vertical axis and
year on the horizontal axis.
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Figure C.5: Relationship between democracy and immigration
Note: This figure shows mean of democracy on the horizontal axis while
the vertical axis depicts mean of log (immigration).
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Figure C.6: Relationship between binary democracy variable and immigration
Note: The vertical axis measures mean of immigration (ims=international
immigration stock) while binary democracy variable is measured on horizontal
axis.
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